¿Puede la tecnología reducir la corrupción? Nueva evidencia empírica utilizando datos de panel

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Publicado: nov. 9, 2020
Palabras clave:
Tecnología, Corrupción, Datos de panel, Mundo

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Brayan Tillaguango
Universidad Nacional de Loja
Roberto Erazo
Universidad Nacional de Loja

Resumen

La tecnología en los últimos años se ha convertido en una herramienta capaz de potenciarel ámbito social, económico y político. El objetivo de esta investigación es examinarel efecto de la tecnología sobre la corrupción a nivel global y en grupos de países usandotécnicas econométricas de datos de panel. Los datos fueron obtenidos del World DevelopmentIndicators (2018) para 72 países durante el periodo 2001-2018. Nuestros resultadosmuestran que el gasto en tecnología es un mecanismo clave para combatir la corrupcióntanto a nivel global como en los países de ingresos altos. Las acciones deben ir desde elcontrol y monitoreo de las actividades gubernamentales hasta una interacción más directaEstado-Sociedad. Por lo tanto, es imperativo que los gobiernos inviertan y destinen unmayor grado de componentes tecnológicos enfocado en los sectores más vulnerables yentidades propensas a ser corruptas.

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Cómo citar
Tillaguango, B., & Erazo, R. (2020). ¿Puede la tecnología reducir la corrupción? Nueva evidencia empírica utilizando datos de panel. Revista Económica, 8(1), 9–18. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.unl.edu.ec/index.php/economica/article/view/837
Número
Vol. 8 Núm. 1 (2020): Revista Económica vol 8 (Enero-Junio 2020)
Sección
ARTÍCULOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN
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